Democracy
Published on 21 November 2026
“If voting changed anything, they’d make it illegal.”
People don’t believe in democracy.
Not in the sense that they believe our present system is insufficiently democratic - if that were the case they would push for more democratisation (polling generally shows that the average voter dislikes the ideas of voters having a more direct say in government). Nor in the sense that they believe democracy doesn’t work - if this were the case we could move towards less-democratic systems and reduce the perverse incentives created by elections.
People don’t believe in democracy in the same way they don’t believe in fairies. It’s not a system of government they entertain as a possibility. This explains why there’s so little debate about whether we should have more or less democracy. Voters possess the vulgar cynicism of a Russian peasant and basically take it for granted that society has always been, and will always be, run by a shadowy cabal of elites. Only naïfs believe in elections.
This has always been the conspiratorial view promoted by populists historically, but I’ve slowly come to the realisation that it is also the tacit worldview today subscribed to by not just voters, but journalists, most public servants, and even most politicians. Indeed complaints about the calibre of the mysterious elites are typically loudest among those near the top. The absence of accountability from ministers, senior civil servants, judges etc. is that they’re all convinced that they’re patsies and that the real decision-making must be happening elsewhere. Our predicament is that everyone agrees the elites run things, but no-one self-identifies as an elite.
So my thesis is that a big reason modern democracies are so dysfunctional is that we don’t believe in democracy as a possible form of government, but have inherited surprisingly democratic institutions. There is a gap between our institutions and our political imaginary.
To focus on the Westminster system (as I will throughout the post), the PM has a tremendous amount of power and his only weakness is that he depends on the support of marginal MPs in the party-room who will lose their jobs if he doesn’t poll well. Whatever the faults of this system, non-responsiveness to voters is not one of them.
Before discussing the consequences, I’ll pre-empt the inevitable ‘why do politicians do so many unpopular things then?’ objection. There are a host of reasons:
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Politicians have to make trade-offs which they’ll be hounded for regardless of which option they choose. Suppose Treasury presents four options: spending cuts, tax hikes, a debt crisis + high inflation + high interest rates, or more immigration. More immigration has always been the correct choice there if you want to be competitive in the next election, even if it’s somewhat unpopular considered in isolation.
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Politicians care about winning elections, but voters are doing a dreadful job of voting in accordance with their policy preferences. To return to the immigration example, John Howard architected mass-migration in Australia and yet won an election pretending to be anti-migrant in the infamous children overboard affair. Boris Johnson similarly got away with hiking immigration while pretending to be anti-immigration. Conversely, what electoral pay-off did Starmer see for bringing migration rates back down? If voters actually paid attention to immigration statistics and voted based on them, politicians would adopt different policies.
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Virtually 100% of policies never escape the bubble of activists and special interests which surround the government, who have very different ideas about good policy than the man on the street. Politicians aim to please with policy, but they learn over time that to do this means pleasing a relatively narrow group of sectional interests. Occasionally a policy escapes containment though; it makes it into the tabloids and everyone asks ‘what the hell was that politician thinking?’
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Politicians don’t know what is popular for other reasons, like the fact that polling is much harder to use effectively than is commonly realised (the framing of a debate matters to a huge degree, so a popular policy can become deeply unpopular due to a slogan from the opposition).
One reason politicians and top officials don’t know what is popular is the incredibly poor information environment they inhabit. While some of this is due to lobbying from business groups, unions and the like, a lot of it is due to government propaganda which contaminates their own understanding of what’s happening. There are three common types of propaganda that can distort decision-making and are worth enumerating:
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Propaganda as policy. An example of this, where the general public were ‘in the loop’, was the attempt to exaggerate the virulence of Covid vis-à-vis young adults (in the hopes of scaring them into never leaving their homes, thus reducing infection rates). This really did work, but the result was that the public demanded draconian untargeted lockdowns even when internally policy-makers realised they were overkill.
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Propaganda to make future policy more politically palatable. A topical example is that presently the British military establishment is fearmongering over an imminent hot war with Russia. I think this probably started as an attempt to justify increased defence spending and other military preparedness measures. There hasn’t been much cut-through, so the average man on the street is blissfully unaware, while a lot of officials have been tricked into overestimating the real threat posed by Russia.
Or to give a second example, governments have tried to convince voters that renewables are much cheaper than, say, coal, which is not true in the most important sense and is widely ridiculed as propaganda by the general public, but has greatly confused policy-makers. -
Propaganda which is institutionalised in NGOs, think-tanks, and the like. This is by far the most harmful in practice. The state might decide to set up, say, an anti-bullying body in the hopes of changing community attitudes (or, more realistically, they pretend this might occur; in reality, setting up these bodies is a very cheap way of pretending to do something). But then the anti-bullying body ends up spending most of its energy lobbying government to increase internet censorship. There is a huge publicly-funded ecosystem whose ultimate function today is to spread misinformation within the public sector to accomplish objectives which really are in their charter.
Once you take into account all these factors, plus the general incompetence of politicians in the first place, you can usually explain why a given policy direction was chosen even if it later proves to be unpopular. It is fairly rare that a politician knowingly hurts their political career by doing something they expect to be punished for by voters.
Before moving on to the effects of elite theory, I want to clarify the epistemic status of what I’m talking about. Many people who reflexively blame everything on shadowy elites lack any clear apperception of the idea itself. When pressed on any specific decision, they might concede that there were no shadowy elites behind it after all, although this won’t lead them to modify their understanding of the world. I would characterise it not as a belief, but rather a ‘habitual interpretative frame’. It structures how they understand the world, and is generative of beliefs, without quite being a belief itself.
To give an analogy which might make it clearer. Suppose someone has a tendency to anthropomorphise objects, which frequently leads them into error. Such a person might consciously know that such-and-such isn’t really ‘like’ a human, and yet persist in the mental habit regardless. It’s not really a belief; it’s what I’m calling a ‘habitual interpretative frame’. It can’t be refuted like an ordinary belief; it’s already not believed, as it were. This is the very problem I face when trying to convince people that elites aren’t directing society – it sounds like I’m refuting a conspiracy theory rather than the default and unspoken assumptions which everyone walks around with.
Here is a non-exhaustive list of the consequences of this habitual interpretive frame.
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Because voters don’t believe in democracy, they have ceased to participate in organised politics. Membership in political parties is in freefall, but it’s not just a party issue. Non-party associations and community groups are similarly in decline. Town halls are less attended. Small-scale elections increasingly struggle to even find candidates to run.
The paranoia among Western intelligence agencies that foreign governments might meddle in elections is well-justified by the fact that every year the political institutions are more hollowed-out and so easier to interfere with. -
While voters are opting out of participatory democracy, they increasingly gravitate to models which instead entreat elites to change how they govern. Petitions, protests and mass-movement politics are as strong as ever, as are activist groups focused on single issues or which represent minority identities. Voters are not depoliticising; instead, there’s a shift in the model of engagement: voters don’t believe in changing government democratically from within, but instead in pressuring government from outside as you would a non-democracy.
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Voters no longer view the public coffers as their money, but rather as a private pool of money for elites. They’re completely uninterested in, say, procurement reform, because how the elites spend their money is their business. However, they’re enraged by any tax increase or spending cuts, which they view as a shift in balance between the people and the elites and a violation of the social contract. It’s well-attested that this phenomenon has gotten much worse over the last century.
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Polling has long shown a divide between voter opinion on policies and who they vote for. In particular, they like populist policies but not so much anyone who espouses them. To give a somewhat recent example, Corbyn’s ‘soak the rich’ brand of economic populism is actually very popular, and voters mostly liked Corbyn as a person, and yet somehow the package was unpopular.
My theory is that voters believe it impractical to elect someone whose policies conflict too much with the imagined elites who really run things. At best, the politician will be ineffective; at worst, it might lead to a constitutional crisis. The result is this strange paradox where the elite consensus is, in reality, perpetuated by voters assuming there’s an untouchable elite consensus. -
There’s a similar gap in candidates who should in theory be popular and who voters actually like to vote for. Contrary to stereotype, voters are quite happy to vote for career politicians with histories of underhanded behaviour. This is because they believe that politicians are essentially ‘champions of the people’ who are contending against the true elites with all the power. Political experience and a willingness to play dirty are presumed to make them more effective in this role.
I also suspect that a lot of voters secretly pine for a ‘political class’, which they can blame when things go wrong. As such, they tend to pick candidates who seem to belong to such a class, which is why the stereotypical politician is so ubiquitous. -
Journalists reinforce all the misconceptions about democracy that I’m elaborating, although it’s difficult to discern to what extent they’re merely pandering to their audience or the first cause for these ideas. They’ve especially imbibed the notion that their job is to ‘speak truth to power’ which means relentlessly criticising everything government does. If, say, a government wants to replace a disused parking lot with a children’s hospital for some nefarious reason, the journalists will back the brave NIMBYs who fight back.
The David v. Goliath imagery employed by journalists has a tendency to bake in the status quo. Only elites can really do things; ‘the people’ can at best push back through various means. This has led us towards a vetocracy as Fukuyama has put it, because veto-power is presumed to be a check on the otherwise untrammelled power of elites. In practice, it’s often the reverse: moneyed interests and the like exploit veto points to prevent governments doing things despite their democratic mandate. By portraying every government action as that of self-serving elites, journalists have done a tremendous amount to abrade the fabric of liberal democracy. -
Formerly political journalism was, to put it bluntly, political. Publications did not shy away from party-affiliation or specific political philosophies. The question was ‘who should govern and how should they do it?’ Over the course of the 20th century there was a shift towards ‘impartiality’ and only presenting ‘the facts’, i.e. the depoliticisation of politics. I’m aware that there are exceptions to this (e.g. Fox News), but they’re continually criticised for bias precisely because they refuse to conform to the new norm.
This strange idea of impartiality ramifies in all sorts of ways. Policy analysis cannot be done with full impartiality, and so this is de-emphasised in press coverage. Policy is instead left to the ‘experts’ while electoral politics should instead focus on largely symbolic matters like what is happening in Gaza or if one should give one’s pronouns. If voters instead focus on democratically changing policies which directly affect their daily lives, this is delegitimated as a form of ‘populism’.
It is almost as if journalists are running cover for hidden elites, except my point is that they don’t really exist and are a figment of the journalists’ imagination. Nonetheless, their worldview slowly permeates into their readership. -
It may surprise readers to know the politicians themselves for the most part don’t believe in democracy. They mostly think their job is to sell policies to the public (which it is for most of their career). One reason oppositions never develop any meaningful policy agenda is that they expect it will be handed over to them on their first day of office by the true elites. “There’s got to be another room down the hall where the real people are making real decisions.” Many senior government figures don’t even bother to find out what powers they do possess, and in their biographies seldom take responsibility for anything except the small number of narrow decisions that were put to them by the civil service.
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When politicians really do want to make a big change, they tend to make new rules which they assume will bind the guys really running things, not realising that these rules will only constrain themselves. Sometimes these are statutory obligations; other times they’re executive rules. When, at some later date, the civil service informs them that something “can’t be done” due to these rules, they invariably feel they’re being thwarted by the deep state, which strengthens their resolve to fight ‘the system’.
So we have a sort of grotesque spectacle where politicians think they’re contending against hidden elites, but are shadowboxing alone. The more bloodied they get, the more wildly they swing, hitting themselves in the face ever harder. No-one can ever name any of these hidden elites, or what constitutional powers the PM would need to usurp them, but everyone thinks they must exist because there’s so much blood everywhere and the politicians are so impotent. -
Belatedly some at the very top might realise that the sham democracy they thought they were participating in is a real one, but it’s a difficult realisation. Usually this is followed by panicked attempts to relinquish this power. Privatisation, devolution, joining supranational entities like the EU, delegating to independent statutory bodies, granting absurd levels of independence to senior civil servants, and reengineering the constitution in the hopes of achieving judicial supremacy are some of the many strategies politicians have tried to avoid wielding power.
They’re aware that they’re incredibly out of their depth. They thought they were signing up for a largely ceremonial role. They especially know that democratic incentives are so perverse that the only public-minded thing to do is try to get the power as far away from voters as possible. There’s little pushback for this from voters (who are effectively being disempowered) because they thought it was a sham democracy in the first instance. -
This attempt to find other sources of authority can be expressed in another way; modern democracies do not feel themselves to be ‘autonomous’ in the sense of self-legislating. The need to cite exogenous principles, say international law or the intentions of the founding fathers or market forces or The Science™ is because no-one really believes that democracies can choose a future for themselves and legitimate it through the electoral process.
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Constitutionally, the civil service is supposed to defer to elected representatives on matters of policy. In the absence of any direction from ministers, they’ve developed an alternative approach I would call ‘stakeholderism’. This means undertaking lengthy and expensive consultations to legitimate decisions made by bureaucrats as ‘democratic’.
One problem is that even when these consultations do involve ordinary members of the public, the selection is very unrepresentative. The eternal boomerreich is not due to the mere numerical size of the baby-boomer cohort, but because their generation contains more people who believe in democracy and so they participate much more (as you’d expect from my thesis – if things are getting worse then newer cohorts will be more affected than older cohorts).
The second problem is what I’ve already alluded to, which is that a lot of the ‘stakeholders’ are members of this vast taxpayer-funded ecosystem of interest groups who represent no real people whatsoever. I do not think this was entirely deliberate; those bodies were mostly created to manipulate the public, not the government which funds them, but regardless of the intention, the primary function of these NGOs is to lobby governments.
In summary, no-one is in charge. This is what happens when you construct a system which gives all power to the voters and then tell everyone actually elections don’t matter, so that all the voters disengage.
The blob looks like the blob because it’s acephalous. It resembles a sort of jellyfish, which is carried by ocean currents hither and thither, and which is only capable of reflexive action. Goal-directed behaviour requires a brain, which the jellyfish and our ‘liberal’ democracy entirely lack. There’s no-one at the top coordinating things, but this is such an absurd circumstance for a society to be in, that it’s very hard to convince anyone that it’s the case.
It’s worth considering how we ended up like this. How our institutions became democratic is already taught in schools, so all I need to explain is how our political consciousness came to reject that this ever happened.
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In psychology there’s what’s known as proportionality bias, the idea that big events have big causes. Say someone’s relative dies due to poor quality healthcare due to underfunding (increasingly common in Commonwealth nations). They will be willing to believe extremely powerful and malign elites are behind this underfunding, or perhaps deep-rooted historical tendencies, or maybe an act of God. What they cannot accept is that virtually no thought goes into the total quantum of healthcare funding, and the calculus is simply ‘is this the cheapest way to win votes?’ from the Treasurer when they’re putting together a budget. The fact that our democracies are failing because voters don’t care and politicians are just pandering to said voters is so offensively banal that everyone instinctively recoils from the idea.
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Centralisation of power has exacerbated the problem (and conversely the US believes in democracy more than the rest of the Anglosphere because power is less centralised). On one hand, the mechanism here is obvious: the more elected representatives who visibly wield power, the less easy it is to believe in the shadowy elites. In Westminster systems there’s no longer even really cabinet government; even supposedly senior ministers like the health minister can be little more than a figurehead.
But there’s a second issue that’s much more general than government. Modern managerialism denies autonomy to both workers and managers. To rise through the hierarchy, you have to be a lickspittle with no initiative or firm ideas. Then you reach the summit of the hierarchy in, say, your 50s, with no experience whatsoever in genuine leadership. This afflicts corporations and the military too. We’ve promoted natural slaves to the top because the natural leaders aren’t ‘team players’, and these natural slaves search in vain for a higher authority to submit to even after they’ve been made the ultimate authority. -
In a similar vein, I’m convinced British and German democracies are especially dysfunctional because they were not so long ago governed by an aristocratic class which has since ceased to exist. Those at the top today do not have the habitus of genuine elites.
This is further compounded by many of those in power subscribing to ideologies more fit for those resisting power than wielding it. Labourism might be perfectly fine if you’re a union-organiser; it is not a serious governing ideology. The refusal of those at the top to identify as genuine elites is because for ideological reasons they view themselves as the underdogs. -
Many of the presuppositions which made democracy conceivable have come to be doubted. For instance, advocates of democracy thought that education and the practice of democracy would mean that every generation of voters would be more suited to democracy than the last. No-one can seriously entertain this anymore. Consider the role debate has in democracy: not only is it declining in quality and quantity (both in politics and elsewhere), but we’ve adopted a Marcusean contempt for debate and reason in any case.
That is only one example; someone could write a whole book on how our understanding of humanity and political practice has shifted in various subtle ways since the Enlightenment so that democracy not only looks misguided, but is scarcely conceivable. -
Speaking of Marcuse, I suspect the single biggest factor is that Anglo-American liberalism was essentially replaced by continental traditions in the academy. And I mean ‘replaced’, not refuted: there was no big showdown between the followers of Dewey and the Frankfurt School; traditional liberals simply went extinct.
First there were the Marxists, but then later even ‘liberalism’ itself came to be transformed, largely by Jewish émigrés from central and eastern Europe. The left-liberals wanted a state which regulated horizontal associations between citizens (to prevent pogroms), and the right-liberals (now called libertarians) wanted a minimal state (to prevent holocausts). Both sides tacitly believed that the state was above the people, not of the people, because they came from fundamentally undemocratic political cultures. Democracy, as understood by 19th-century Americans, was a wholly alien concept to them.
And this trend continued: towards the end of the 20th century the left was heavily influenced by LatAm movements (whence the modern usage of ‘neoliberal’) and today the post-liberal right is drawing from the Catholic tradition.
And to return to the starting point of this essay, and what inspired this essay, none of these traditions are even all that overtly hostile to democracy. There was far more criticism of democracy in the Anglo-American tradition (think Lippmann or HL Mencken) than there was afterwards. Their successors did not really bother to attack democracy because, coming from undemocratic polities, they simply never believed in democracy in the first place. It is their perspective which is now ours.
Finally, I’ll end on a somewhat pessimistic point. My view is that institutions are more malleable than the underlying political imaginary. Plenty of British colonials managed to replicate British institutions, especially what made them good, without too much difficulty because they were endowed with British sensibilities about how a society ought to be ordered. Conversely, attempts to transplant Western political institutions into third-world nations have mostly ended in failure.
What this means is that, insofar as there’s a chasm between our political consciousness and our existing political institutions, it’s the institutions which will have to change to bridge the two. The sort of democracy that de Tocqueville wrote about is no longer available to us as a possibility. I would go further and say any maximalist democracy, with universal suffrage and all constitutional power in the hands of elected representatives and their direct appointees, will be dysfunctional due to how people today understand power to work.
There are two possible trajectories from here. One is a move towards a technocracy, where elites (who identify as such) are given explicit powers at the cost of less democratic accountability.
To give a demonstration of what I mean: our governments have remarkably little capacity to regulate themselves. This is deliberate: voters are meant to be the check on government, and any internal regulatory capacity would be competing directly with voters in this regard. E.g., if a rule is made that all grants need to be cost-benefitted, that directly reduces the discretionary power of elected officials and thus voters, which is why such rules are either rare or only advisory. This is no longer tenable: voters don’t feel that their job is to monitor the grant-making process, and changing their mindset is all but impossible, so regulatory bodies made up of technocrats must be created to fill that role.
The second possibility, and the one that looks more plausible at present, is Caesarism. Populists will arise from the far-left and far-right promising to dethrone elites, which will invariably prove unsuccessful because there are no elites to dethrone. This will lead to ever more extremism, until eventually one of the leaders suspends democratic processes in the name of the people (and quite rightly – because they’re not working – i.e. you can’t ‘drain the swamp’ yet keep Congress in its present state).